It has been known for over a century that there is an afferent, as well as an efferent, component to the visceral-atonomic nervous system. Despite the fundamental importance of bodily afferent information- sometimes called interoception- to central nervous system control of visceral organ function, emotional-motivational processes, and dysfunction of these processes, including psychosomatic disorders, its role did not receive much attention until quite recently. This is the first comprehensive review of this topic and it covers both neurobiological and psychobiological aspects. (...) The author first defines the issue and gives an historical background starting with the James-Lange theory of emotion, and addresses learning and motivation, roots in Pavlovian conditioning research, and operant conditioning of visceral function. In the second section he reviews recent scientific findings in the neural basis of visceral perception and studies in cardiovascular-respiratory and alimentary interoception. Finally, he discusses several related areas of research and theory including drug state issues, interoception and psychiatric disorders, and bodily consciousness, and suggests directions for future investigation. The book will be of interest to scientists in neurobiology, psychology, and brain imaging, to indivuals in related clinical fields such as psychiatry, neurology, cardiology, gastroenterology, and clinical psychology, and to their students and trainees. (shrink)

Recent discussions of ontology have shown an interest in the relation between logic, language and ontology. Quine, for example, has shown how sentences translated into canonical form determine ontological commitment in terms of the values over which bound variables range, while Strawson has maintained that conditions inherent to language determine a system of ontological concepts. But in these discussions the role linguistics might have in the construction of ontological schemes is seldom seriously considered. Except for Benjamin Lee Whorf’s examination through (...) the use of descriptive linguistic techniques of the relation between ontological schemes and the structure of languages, little has been done to apply the results of linguistic research to questions of ontology. In the past this could be attributed to the absence in structural linguistics of significant generalizations about language above the morphophonemic level. This situation has altered with the development of transformational linguistic theory. That theory contains an extensive set of generalizations about the form and content of any natural language. (shrink)

One finds throughout the history of philosophy repeated though apparently unsuccessful attempts to decide upon the nature or essence of language. This is not a trivial problem. When philosophers themselves have tried to resolve it they seem inevitably to postulate some nonovert level of linguistic form which is more basic to language than its overt grammatical forms. Now linguists have become involved in making similar claims. This is in large measure due to Noam Chomsky’s revolutionary work in transformational generative grammar, (...) research which has lead to a new conception of the goals and nature of linguistic theory. Whatever might be the ultimate fate of Chomsky’s own proposals concerning the nature of language, his insistence on descriptive precision and on theoretically sophisticated models in linguistics will remain paradigmatic. What is in fact most revolutionary about transformational linguistics is not the construction of precise and detailed grammars per se, but the parallel claim that there exist underlying realities of language which to a large extent dictate its overt form and content. For Chomsky these realities are part of the deep structure of language. Although other linguists do not share his view that there is an exclusively syntactically based deep structure, transformationalists generally do agree that there is some linguistic level underlying surface structure which accounts for it. Disagreement exists over the nature of this underlying reality, and it is on this issue that linguistics has a significant point of contact with philosophy. (shrink)

Karl Buhler was a professor of psychology at the University of Vienna when, in 1933, he published "The Axiomatization of the Language Sciences." This book is a translation of that essay, together with an opening, expository and critical essay by Innis of about equal length which deals with Buhler's total language theory. Buhler's work is not well known among English speaking philosophers and psychologists of language, and this exposition and translation provides a proper introduction to him. It is an appropriate (...) project both because his work had a marked influence with some well known German philosophers of language, particularly Ernst Cassirer, and because his own views on language and its characteristic structure are consonant with many aspects of recent semiological and phenomenological views of language. Thus, at the very least this volume provides a missing historical link designed to remind some linguistic researchers of a past they might not know they possess. (shrink)

Increasing interest in farmers’ local soil knowledge and soil management practice as a way to promote sustainable agriculture and soil conservation needs a reliable means to connect to it. This study sought to examine if Visual Soil Assessment and farmer workshops were suitable means to engage, communicate and preserve farmers’ LSK in two mountainous communes of Central Vietnam. Twenty-four farmers with reasonable or comprehensive LSK from previously studied communes were selected for the efficacy of VSA and farmer workshops for integrating (...) LSK into a well-accepted soil assessment tool. In field sites chosen by the farmers, VSA was independently executed by both farmers and scientists at the same time. Close congruence of VSA scores between the two groups highlighted that farmers could competently undertake VSA. Farmers’ VSA score was compared with their perception of field’s soil quality. For the majority of farmers’ perception of soil quality was consistent to their VSA score, while the remainder perceived their soil quality was lower than their VSA score. For most farmers their assessment of soil quality using VSA valued their LSK, and the two measures were well aligned. Soil colour and presence or vulnerability to erosion were common soil characteristics mentioned by farmers and affected the final VSA score. Farmers’ participation in VSA and workshops strengthen farmers’ confidence in their LSK and provided guidance on the impact of their soil management on soil improvement and conservation. (shrink)

Why and under what conditions are individuals altruistic to family and friends in their social networks? Evolutionary psychology suggests that such behaviour is primarily the product of adaptations for kin- and reciprocal altruism, dependent on the degree of genetic relatedness and exchange of benefits, respectively. For this reason, individuals are expected to be more altruistic to family members than to friends: whereas family members can be the recipients of kin and reciprocal altruism, friends can be the recipients of reciprocal altruism (...) only. However, there is a question about how the effect of kinship is implemented at the proximate psychological level. One possibility is that kinship contributes to some general measure of relationship quality (such as ‘emotional closeness’), which in turn explains altruism. Another possibility is that the effect of kinship is independent of relationship quality. The present study tests between these two possibilities. Participants (N= 111) completed a self-report questionnaire about their willingness to be altruistic, and their emotional closeness, to 12 family members and friends at different positions in their extended social networks. As expected, altruism was greater for family than friends, and greater for more central layers of the network. Crucially, the results showed that kinship made a significant unique contribution to altruism, even when controlling for the effects of emotional closeness. Thus, participants were more altruistic towards kin than would be expected if altruism was dependent on emotional closeness alone – a phenomenon we label a ‘kinship premium’. These results have implications for the ongoing debate about the extent to which kin relations and friendships are distinct kinds of social relationships, and how to measure the ‘strength of ties’ in social networks. (shrink)

Reciprocal altruism involves foregoing an immediate benefit for the sake of a greater long-term reward. It follows that individuals who exhibit a stronger preference for future over immediate rewards should be more disposed to engage in reciprocal altruism – in other words, ‘patient’ people should be more cooperative. The present study tested this prediction by investigating whether participants’ contributions in a public-good game correlated with their ‘discount rate’. The hypothesis was supported: patient people are indeed more cooperative. The paper discusses (...) alternative interpretations of this result, and makes some suggestions for future research. (shrink)

Upper echelons theory posits that organisational performance reflects the personal values and cognitive frames of the top management team and, crucially, that greater heterogeneity in individual backgrounds of senior executives leads to better outcomes. However, often missing from this research is a more developed account of how this relationship between the characteristics of TMTs and performance is also mediated by internal conditions within organisations. In this paper we begin to address this deficiency focusing on the mediating impact of employee satisfaction (...) and the styles and practices of line managers. Looking at the empirical case of English National Health Services acute care hospital trusts, we use a multiple mediation model to analyse the relationship between board heterogeneity, performance and these two organisational factors. A variance-based structural equation modelling approach is applied to a sample of 102 boards of directors. First, the results lend support to the UE hypothesis that there is a positive impact of board heterogeneity and hospital-level performance. Second, the analysis shows that the relationship heterogeneity–performance is positively influenced by: the styles and practices of line managers; the levels of staff satisfaction; and by their mutually reinforcing roles. (shrink)

Though emotional faces preferentially reach awareness, the present study utilised both objective and subjective indices of awareness to determine whether they enhance subjective awareness and “blindsight”. Under continuous flash suppression, participants localised a disgusted, fearful or neutral face (objective index), and rated their confidence (subjective index). Psychopathic traits were also measured to investigate their influence on emotion perception. As predicted, fear increased localisation accuracy, subjective awareness and “blindsight” of upright faces. Coldhearted traits were inversely related to subjective awareness, but not (...) “blindsight”, of upright fearful faces. In a follow-up experiment using inverted faces, increased localisation accuracy and awareness, but not “blindsight”, were observed for fear. Surprisingly, awareness of inverted fearful faces was positively correlated with coldheartedness. These results suggest that emotion enhances both pre-conscious processing and the qualitative experience of awareness, but that pre-conscious and conscious processing of emotional faces rely on at least partially dissociable cognitive mechanisms. (shrink)

It is considered in some quarters that hypothesis‐driven methods are the only valuable, reliable or significant means of scientific advance. Data‐driven or ‘inductive’ advances in scientific knowledge are then seen as marginal, irrelevant, insecure or wrong‐headed, while the development of technology—which is not of itself ‘hypothesis‐led’ (beyond the recognition that such tools might be of value)—must be seen as equally irrelevant to the hypothetico‐deductive scientific agenda. We argue here that data‐ and technology‐driven programmes are not alternatives to hypothesis‐led studies in (...) scientific knowledge discovery but are complementary and iterative partners with them. Many fields are data‐rich but hypothesis‐poor. Here, computational methods of data analysis, which may be automated, provide the means of generating novel hypotheses, especially in the post‐genomic era. BioEssays 26:99–105, 2004. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In this article, I examine what Kant’s Formula of Universal Law requires of an individual agent in situations of great need, e.g.: if you can easily help a drowning child, or if you know of a famine situation in another country. I first explain why I do not simply apply the standard interpretation of how one can derive concrete duties from Kant’s Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative. I then glean an alternative procedure from Kant’s texts and give the (...) reasons for using that interpretation. Finally, I apply the alternative procedure to situations of great need. – According to the interpretation I glean from Kant’s texts, one (i) should not make an exception to (ii) laws that we believe to be objectively necessary, whereby we derive these rules from (iii) universal ends of humankind. Since we take survival as one of the universal ends of mankind, we deem helping someone whose life is in danger as objectively necessary (to achieve the end). The formal Categorical Imperative demands that one does not make an exception to this rule. Applying this interpretation to cases of great need depends on at least three factors: (i) how urgent the need is, (ii) how great the costs are to the one who helps, and (iii) how many people can help. But at one extreme, where you are the only one who can easily save an innocent person’s life, the Kantian procedure generates a strict duty to help the other in need. (shrink)

In the January number of the quarterly journal published by The British Institute of Philosophy, called Philosophy, Sir James Jeans with extraordinary ability has represented the view of the universe which may be held now in the twentieth century by a mathematician, and concludes that this representation contributes to and upholds an idealistic philosophy. Now with the contention that an idealistic philosophy is superior to any other, that is to say nearer the truth, we may be allowed to sympathize. Several (...) physicists, even in the nineteenth century, were inclined to sustain the essence of Berkeley's view, or to consider that metaphysical truth must lie somewhere in that direction. G. F. FitzGerald, for instance, was notably of that opinion. But he was not prepared on that account to abandon the physical view of existence, and to take refuge in mere mathematical abstractions. (shrink)

The Commentary on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides an in-depth article-by-article analysis of all of the Vienna Convention's provisions. Each provision's analysis consists of (I) Purpose and Function of the Article, (II) Historical Background with Negotiating History, (III) Elements of the Article and finally (IV) Treaties of International Organizations. In short, the present Commentary contains a comprehensive legal analysis of all aspects of the international law of treaties. Furthermore, where the law of treaties reaches into other (...) fields of international law, e.g. the law of state responsibility, the relevant interfaces are discussed and contextualized. With its focus on international practice, the Commentary is an invaluable reference for both academia and practitioners of international law. (shrink)

It is well appreciated that Moore, in the final years of the nineteenth century, emphatically rejected the monistic idealism of F. H. Bradley. It has, however, been less widely noticed that Moore’s concern to defeat monism remained with him well into the 1920s. In the following discussion I describe the role that Moore’s adoption of a ‘common sense’ orientation played in his criticisms of Bradley’s monism. I begin by outlining certain distinctive features of Bradley’s sceptical methodology, before describing the contrasting (...) approach of Moore as it appears in 1910-11 and 1925. I bring these methodological differences into relief by assessing the status of common sense claims in the work of each figure. I show that Moore’s common sense methodology was employed against Bradley’s monistic conclusions, and that it was adopted with Bradley squarely in mind. (shrink)

The following article is concerned with the life and the literary work of Margareta Klopstock, a figure commonly overshadowed by her more prominent husband. Previous research has usually interpreted Margareta Klopstock’s contributions to Der Messias as mere assistance work (›Hilfsarbeit‹) and labeled her Hinterlaßne Schriften (posthumously 1759) as epigonal. This study, in contrast, argues for an understanding of her marriage as a literary cooperation and attempts the very first systematical description of the author’s work as a devotional poetics in its (...) own right. Via transcription and dictation, Margareta Klopstock was not only, and in various ways, involved in her husband’s writing; more crucially, she created a space of literary-critical resonance for F. G. Klopstock’s works, and made efforts to introduce Der Messias into the anglophone sphere. In turn, typical for her own writing are relations to enlightenment theology and contemporary English literature (Elizabeth Singer Rowe and Samuel Richardson), to Der nordische Aufseher (polemics against the freethinkers), and women’s religious education. Thus, the article shows that the verdicts of secondariness gravely underestimate both the historical significance of Margareta Klopstock and her literary legacy. (shrink)

Routledge is now re-issuing this prestigious series of 204 volumes originally published between 1910 and 1965. The titles include works by key figures such asC.G. Jung, Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, Otto Rank, James Hillman, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney and Susan Isaacs. Each volume is available on its own, as part of a themed mini-set, or as part of a specially-priced 204-volume set. A brochure listing each title in the "International Library of Psychology" series is available upon request.

This article considers several problems concerning the origin of the soul in the work of the nineteenth century American theologian, William G. T. Shedd. He opts for the traducian position, which is, that the soul is passed down from parents to child, in a way similar to the passing of physical seed from two human parents that fuse in syngamy to form a genetically distinct entity. The essay considers three problems with this view. The first concerns the composition of human (...) natures; the second, whether souls are fissiparous; and the third, the relationship between traducianism, creationism and Augustinian realism. (shrink)

The modal -calculus extends basic modal logic with second-order quantification in terms of arbitrarily nested fixpoint operators. Its satisfiability problem is EXPTIME-complete. Decision procedures for the modal -calculus are not easy to obtain though since the arbitrary nesting of fixpoint constructs requires some combinatorial arguments for showing the well-foundedness of least fixpoint unfoldings. The tableau-based decision procedures so far also make assumptions on the unfoldings of fixpoint formulas, e.g., explicitly require formulas to be in guarded normal form. In this paper (...) we present a tableau calculus for deciding satisfiability of arbitrary, i.e., not necessarily guarded -calculus formulas. It is based on a new unfolding rule for greatest fixpoint formulas which allows unguarded formulas to be handled without an explicit transformation into guarded form, thus avoiding a exponential blow-up in formula size. We prove soundness and completeness of the calculus, and compare it empirically to using guarded transformation instead. The new unfolding rule can also be used to handle nested star operators in PDL formulas correctly. (shrink)

The establishment of distinct cellular identities was pivotal during the evolution of Metazoa, enabling the emergence of an array of specialized tissues with different functions. In most animals including vertebrates, cell specialization occurs in response to a combination of intrinsic (e.g., cellular ontogeny) and extrinsic (e.g., local environment) factors that drive the acquisition of unique characteristics at the single‐cell level. The first functional organ system to form in vertebrates is the cardiovascular system, which is lined by a network of endothelial (...) cells whose organ‐specific characteristics have long been recognized. Recent genetic analyses at the single‐cell level have revealed that heterogeneity exists not only at the organ level but also between neighboring endothelial cells. Thus, how endothelial heterogeneity is established has become a key question in vascular biology. Drawing upon evidence from multiple organ systems, here we will discuss the role that lineage history may play in establishing endothelial heterogeneity. (shrink)

A central question in the ethical debate on the practice of relinquishing in vitro fertilization surplus embryos for family building is whether we ought to think of it more in terms of donating these embryos or in terms of having them adopted. Deciding between these two alternatives is more than a matter of mere terminology. It has an impact on normative questions, e.g., on the question of what criteria for parent selection ought to be applied to the recipients of the (...) embryos, and on the moral evaluation of the act of ‘donating’ the embryo or ‘having it adopted’. In this article, I defend the view that we should conceptualize the relinquishment of spare embryos according to the adoption model, not as a donation. Section 2 sketches the outline of the argument by making clear how we may ground a defense of the adoption model in a theory of parental responsibility without implicitly elevating the moral status of the embryo. Section 3 contains a preliminary defense of the adoption model that draws on geneticism as what seems to me the most persuasive theory of parental responsibility. In section 4, I examine three objections to geneticism and either rebut them or, insofar as they are justified, try to accommodate them into my view. In section 5, I point out some features that distinguish embryo adoption from the adoption of (born) children. I contend, however, that these differences are compatible with the adoption model. Section 6 is concerned with the normative ramifications of this view. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:192 HUME'S REFUTATION OF — WOLLASTON? Recently while rereading Book III of Hume's Treatise I was struck by an anomaly in the text that I had never noticed before. It consists in the juxtaposition of two arguments Hume offers regarding the source of the moral qualities of our actions. At first I dismissed Hume's arrangement of these arguments as being of little consequence — one of them appears in (...) a footnote — but the more I thought about the juxtaposition the more it intrigued and puzzled me. Expecting that it must have been noted by other readers I checked through the literature to find some discussion of it. Since after a long search I have failed to uncover anything, and believing the point, which relates to Hume's central view concerning morality, to be of some interest, I have decided to write this brief paper. Two passages from § 1, entitled "Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason," of Part I, Book III, are involved. Hume begins the section by arguing that, because of the limited scope of its capacities, reason cannot distinguish between right and wrong or, as he puts it, between virtue and vice, and therefore that it is a mistake to speak of actions as being reasonable or unreasonable. Since Hume's views on this question are well-known and since they are not directly relevant to the point of my paper, I shall not pursue them further, but turn directly to the issue at hand. After having stated his argument at the beginning of § 1 and reached the conclusion that "actions may be laudable or blameable, but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable," Hume turns to answer an objection that might be made against him by a rationalist ethicist. He writes: 193 But perhaps it may be said, that tho' no will or action can be immediately contradictory to reason, yet we may find such a contradiction in some of the attendants of the action, that is, in its causes or effects (T 459). Pursuing this objection, Hume first considers the causes of our actions. He acknowledges that we can be led astray in what we do in two ways; by making mistakes of fact, first, about the nature of some object we desire (e.g., thinking some fruit delicious when it really is not) and, second, about the means we should employ to gain the object (e.g., attempting to pluck the fruit when it is beyond our reach). Although these errors cause us to act in ways that may be termed unreasonable in a "figurative and improper way of speaking" (T 459), they cannot be the source of any immorality in what we do because they are committed involuntarily and innocently. A person who falls into such errors and acts on them is "more to be lamented than blam'd" (T 459). To conclude his answer to the rationalistic objection he has raised, Hume turns next to the issue of whether the immorality of our actions can be explained in terms of the unreasonableness of any of their effects. In a memorable passage he denies that the fact that false judgments are the effects of our actions can be the source of immorality in what we do. As to those judgments which are the effects of our actions, and which, when false, give occasion to pronounce the actions contrary to truth and reason; we may observe, that our actions never cause any judgment, either true or false, in ourselves, and that 'tis only on others they have such an influence. 'Tis certain, that an action, on many occasions, may give rise to false conclusions in others; and that a 194 person, who thro' a window sees any lewd behaviour of mine with my neighbour's wife, may be so simple as to imagine she is certainly my own. In this respect my action resembles somewhat a lye or falshood; only with this difference, which is material, that I perform not the action with any intention of giving rise to a false judgment in another, but merely to satisfy my lust and passion. It causes, however, a mistake and false judgment by accident; and the falshood... (shrink)